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IETE TECHNICAL REVIEW, Vol 23, No 6, 2006
 

Fig 1 Multilayer IDS using Mobile Agents

Once the anomaly has been detected the attack type and attacker is determined. This is done by getting the detailed attack information from a set of identification rules, which have been precomputed for known attacks.

6. SECURING EXISTING ROUTING PROTOCOLS

Traditional routing protocols have to be made secured because they were not fundamentally designed to be secure [10, 26]. Table 2 shows different attacks suffered by various routing protocols. Some of the modifications to secure existing routing protocols for MANET are discussed below.

6.1. Securing AODV Protocol

The AODV Protocol suffers from Black Hole problem, where an attacker node routes all the packets to itself as being the destination and later discard all the packets. One solution [10] is allowing only the destination nodes to reply a route request and restricting the intermediate nodes for the purpose. Another solution is to check the existence of the route from intermediate node to the destination by using one more route to the intermediate node that replays the packet.

 
TABLE 2: Attacks sufferred by various routing protocols
Attack Routing Protocol
Black Hole AODV
impersonation by malicious node DSR, AODV
Worm Hole DSR, AODV, LSR
Denial of Service (DOS) DSR
False Routing Information Advertisement for traffic attraction DSR, AODV, SDV
Route Salvation DSR
Packet Dropping AODV, DSDV
   

Alampalayam et. al. propose [27] a Routing Attack Security Model (RASM) for securing MANETs against, Black Holes. This model has three modules: